Terms and Conditions

Please read these conditions carefully before using this site. By using this site, you signify your assent to the following terms and conditions of use without limitation or qualification. In particular, you consent to the use of all cookies on this website for the purposes described in the terms of use. If you do not agree to these terms or to the use of cookies as described below, do not use this site. AllianceBernstein may at any time revise these terms of use. You are bound by any such revisions and should therefore periodically visit this page to review the then current terms of use to which you are bound. This site is for informational purposes and does not constitute an offer to sell or a solicitation of an offer to buy any security which may be referenced herein.

Terms Of Use

This site is solely intended for use by professional/institutional investors and institutional-investment industry consultants.

Do you wish to continue?

 

Earnings Surprises...Are You Kidding Me?

11 September 2015
4 min read
Adam Yee| Senior Quantitative Analyst—US Growth Equities
Vincent Dupont, CFA| Director of Research—US Growth Equities

In the game called the quarterly earnings season, positive surprises have become so commonplace among US large-cap stocks that they’ve nearly lost all meaning. We wonder why investors keep playing along.

The media are an integral part of the entertainment, cheering or booing companies from the sidelines as if earnings season were a sporting event. This incessant focus further feeds the earnings-surprise fervor.

The assumption is that a consensus-beating company is healthy and performing well or that macroeconomic conditions are improving. But here’s the thing about so-called earnings surprises: they depend not only on what companies are doing but also on what sell-side analysts are doing. And sell-side analysts have been doing some odd things lately.

The display below shows the progression of consensus earnings estimates for the aggregate of S&P 500 companies for calendar years 2013, 2014 and 2015. As the downward slope indicates, analysts’ forecasts for each forthcoming year started out wildly optimistic (in retrospect) and were steadily pruned as reality (and actual results) set in. As each year drew to a close, positive earnings surprises became more frequent.

Recent Forecasts Show a Distinct Pattern
Consensus S&P 500 EPS Estimates
Recent Forecasts Show a Distinct Pattern

Through August 31, 2015
Source: Factset, S&P and AB

The problem with this earnings-season gamesmanship is that it deprives investors of a truthful reading of economic and corporate developments. That’s because earnings beats are no longer special; they’re the norm. On average, 69% of US large-cap companies have surpassed their consensus estimates over the past 28 quarters. Even at the depths of the 2008 financial crisis, more than 50% of S&P 500 firms posted positive surprises (Display). On-target reports have become a rarity.

Upsdie Surprises have Become the Norm
Breakdown of S&P 500 Quarterly Earnings Surprises
Upsdie Surprises have Become the Norm

Through June 30, 2015
Index constituents rebalnce every calendar year-end
Source: FactSet,S&P and AB

The Lake Wobegon Effect?

If analysts were consistently applying their best guess to their earnings forecasts, the consensus average of positive surprises would tend to fluctuate around 50%, not 69%, over the long term. After all, the distribution of forecast errors should be random unless economic or company fundamentals change (and assuming that analysts as a group do not have a crystal ball). But the forecasts are biased, so the frequency of error is too: after the initial burst of optimism, analysts appear to be lowballing estimates whether fundamentals are improving or not—and positive surprises are the result.

To illustrate the irrelevance of upside surprises at the stock level, consider Goldman Sachs’s experience (Display). Over the past 10 years, Goldman Sachs missed quarterly estimates only six (depicted by green diamonds) out of 39 quarters. Even when analysts were trimming their estimates, the company still managed to top them (as depicted by the blue diamonds). In 2008, as the business was deteriorating, Goldman beat Street estimates in two of the four quarters, with the biggest miss coming in the fourth quarter, when earnings fell short of consensus by 106%. By then, the stock had already plunged 64% for the year.

Surprises often Obscure What's Really Goind On
Goldman Sachs Consensus EPS Estimates and Surprises
Surprises often Obscure What's Really Goind On

Through July 16, 2015
Source: FactSet, S&P, company reports and AB

This is far from an isolated phenomenon. We’re not saying that all positive surprises are devoid of relevance or that they should be ignored entirely. But we think they need to be viewed on a case-by- case basis and with greater skepticism. In our view, it should be up to the market—not analysts or news organizations—to determine whether an earnings report is a surprise or not. As a general rule, we think a company’s results should only be deemed a positive surprise if the stock outperforms the market immediately following the earnings release, and disappointing if it underperforms. This should be obvious, but you wouldn’t know it from the media’s hyperbolic focus on the consensus scorecard.

The situation has reached a point at which analysts, when previewing company earnings prospects, frequently declare that they do not expect any “surprises.” But the point about surprises—real ones, at least—is that they are unexpected. What analysts actually seem to be saying in these instances is that their estimates might be accurate for a change.

If a company cannot be judged by whether it is beating consensus, then how should it be judged? We believe an analyst’s efforts would be better spent investigating and providing insights into company fundamentals, particularly as they relate to the firm’s long-term potential to generate profits above its cost of capital. Our research and experience show that a business’s excess return on invested capital (ROIC) is a highly reliable predictor of that company’s potential for above-market stock returns. Those odds tend to increase even more when a firm’s ROIC is improving.

Our advice: tune out the talk of earnings surprises and tune into information on company fundamentals, and especially ROIC—or, in other words, the factors that really matter in the pursuit of investment outperformance.

The views expressed herein do not constitute research, investment advice or trade recommendations and do not necessarily represent the views of all AB portfolio-management teams.


About the Authors

Adam Yee joined the firm in 2004 and is a Senior Vice President and Senior Quantitative Analyst for the US Growth Equities portfolios. He previously served as a senior associate portfolio manager within the Global Portfolio Management Group, where he covered growth equity products. Yee holds a BA in economics from Trinity College and an MBA in finance from Fordham University's Graduate School of Business (now the Gabelli School of Business). Location: New York

Vincent Dupont is a Senior Vice President and Director of Research for US Growth Equities. Before joining the US Growth team in 2009 as a portfolio manager, he spent 10 years as a fundamental research analyst covering semiconductors and semiconductor capital equipment. Prior to joining the firm in 1999, Dupont researched the Russian economy at the Council on Foreign Relations for a year and worked at the US State Department as an arms control official for six years. He holds a BA in political science from Northwestern University and a PhD in international affairs/Russian studies from Columbia University, and is a CFA charterholder. Location: New York