A Tactical Investment Outlook as Global Growth Slows

December 14, 2022
23 min read

At this point in the cycle, with economic growth slowing, inflation still well above normal and a major pivot in monetary policy, tactical outlooks seem inevitably drawn to assessing the minutiae of central bank policy announcements. In this note, we aim to look beyond that single aspect while also addressing key questions we have been hearing in client conversations.

Right now, there is a real need for investors to distinguish tactical positions from strategic positions. Strategically, it’s imperative to position portfolios for inflation that’s likely to stay above pre-pandemic levels for an extended period, which translates into a need for real-asset exposures—an adjustment that still hasn’t happened. However, for near-term horizons of one year, questions about liquidity, lower growth and what’s already been priced into markets point to a somewhat defensive position. 

Has There Been Enough Capitulation?

Our main tactical concern: there hasn’t been enough capitulation in risk assets (equities and credit) to reflect slower economic growth. 

Whether or not the US is explicitly in a recession, we would expect a period of roughly zero growth in real terms would spur a bigger change in investors’ behavior. Credit yields are at 10-year-plus highs and equities have seen outflows, but we still see room for slower growth—and geopolitical considerations—to be priced into valuations. For investors with long time horizons, our view is more positive.

This view of risk-asset valuations raises a question: Is it possible to time markets? This is extremely hard to do, and establishing skill requires a long run of data. However, given that we’re in a more volatile, less trended environment today, there’s more of a strategic incentive to try.

Liquidity Concerns Are an Emerging Issue

Beyond directional outlooks for asset classes and factors, liquidity is a huge emerging issue that we don’t think is reflected in markets or asset allocations. It’s a topic that comes up increasingly in our dialogues with clients, driven by the confluence of very powerful forces:

  • The macro backdrop features less macro liquidity as central banks (try to) pivot from quantitative easing to quantitative tightening. 
  • Institutional portfolios have become significantly less liquid as a result of the rotation into private assets over the past decade.
  • Liquidity in public markets has become more fragile.1

One could also cite slower growth, the rupture of crypto markets, the return of the business cycle and potential geopolitical risks as contributors to liquidity risks. This backdrop isn’t enough to make us bearish, but investors should put more emphasis on liquidity than normal, making this a recurring focus that intrudes on tactical allocation questions. 

The UK liability-driven investing crisis may be a canary in the coal mine in this regard, and investors should expect liquidity to be an increasingly dominant issue in asset allocation over the next year—particularly on the key strategic allocation question of public versus private assets, a point well addressed in upcoming research. In the sections to follow, we’ll lay out our tactical view on asset classes and factors (Display 1).

Display 1: Key Tactical Views
Display 1: Key Tactical Views

Historical analysis and current forecasts do not guarantee future results.
As of December 2, 2022
Source: AllianceBernstein (AB)

Equities: Capitulation Overhang, but Also Positive Forward Indicators 

Stocks face an overhang on two fronts: a lack of capitulation by investors and by analysts in the face of slowing economic growth. 

While bond funds saw large outflows earlier this year, net outflows for equities have been muted (Display 2). There have been outflows from European equities, which seems fair given the scale of the potential growth shock from risks to the energy supply, but there’s been no capitulation for global equities. So far in the fourth quarter, global equity funds have seen US$50 billion of inflows.

Display 2: Equity Outflows Have Been Muted
Cumulative Global Asset Class Fund Flows (USD Billion)
Display 2: Equity Outflows Have Been Muted

Historical analysis and current forecasts do not guarantee future results.
Chart shows cumulative weekly flow into all equity funds, bond funds and money market funds
As of November 9, 2022
Source: AB Bernstein Research, Emerging Portfolio Fund Research Global and AB

In addition to investor sentiment, analysts are the other aspect of sentiment overhang. Consensus expectations for 2023 have been persistently high, despite sharply weakening macroeconomic data and rapidly tightening financial conditions. The consensus earnings outlook has moderated somewhat since mid-year, but still stands at 5.1% growth for next year in the US (Display 3). In Europe, the forecast decline has been sharper but still indicates positive growth. A curtailment of natural gas supply on the order of 22%–30% implies an earnings decline of about 15% over the next year.

An important mitigating point is that equity analysts operate in a nominal forecasting environment, whereas economists forecast in real terms. This might not have mattered much in recent years, but it matters a lot now. Equities represent claims on cash flows determined in the real economy, so it’s possible to pass through inflation to some extent. Therefore, we shouldn’t expect earnings forecasts to decline all the way to previous recession levels.

Display 3: US Consensus Earnings Expectations Have Started to Moderate but Remain Elevated
Display 3: US Consensus Earnings Expectations Have Started to Moderate but Remain Elevated

Historical analysis and current forecasts do not guarantee future results.
EPS: earnings-per-share
As of November 21, 2022
Source: MSCI, Thomson Reuters Datastream, Thomson Reuters I/B/E/S and AB

In contrast to consensus estimates, our indicator for US earnings (Display 4), which combines a broad range of short-term and long-term signals to forecast earnings growth 12 months ahead, suggests earnings growth close to 0%.2 Here, the slope of the line of best fit through the reading of relevant variables gives an implied path of earnings.

Display 4: US Tactical Earnings Indicator Shows Near-Zero Growth
Display 4: US Tactical Earnings Indicator Shows Near-Zero Growth

Historical analysis and current forecasts do not guarantee future results.
As of November 11, 2022
Source: Bloomberg; “Economic Policy Uncertainty Index," Economic Policy Uncertainty, http://www.policyuncertainty.com; Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED), National Restaurant Association, Thomson Reuters Datastream, University of Michigan and AB

Meanwhile, longer-horizon sentiment indicators are showing a stronger support signal for equities, most starkly our cross-border flow indicator (Display 5). This metric, which tracks overseas investors’ equity purchases, has declined materially since the start of the year. In the past, such rapid declines in cross-border equity flows have been associated with overly pessimistic investor sentiment and strong global equity returns over the ensuing 12-month horizon. Similarly, the balance of net buyback versus issuance is in line with its most supportive historical levels, with corporates again emerging as a strong source of demand for equities. This tends to also support equity returns over 12-month forward periods. 

Display 5: Global Cross-Border Equity Flow Indicator Signals Support
Display 5: Global Cross-Border Equity Flow Indicator Signals Support

Historical analysis and current forecasts do not guarantee future results.
Chart shows the combined net purchases of overseas equities for US, UK, euro area (post 1997), Germany (1987–1997), France (1993–1997) and Japan (post 1997). Data derived from external sector portfolio investment data published in the financial accounts of central banks. The series is monthly flows smoothed over three months, annualised and normalised by the market cap of the Thomson Reuters Datastream World Index.
As of July 31, 2022
Source: Banque de France, Deutsche Bundesbank, ECB, Ministry of Finance Japan, Office for National Statistics, Thomson Reuters Datastream, US Fed and AB

Valuation matters less for tactical calls, but equity multiples have moderated from extreme levels. The Shiller Cyclically Adjusted Price Earnings (CAPE) multiple for the US has declined from a peak of nearly 39 times at the end of 2021 to 29 times (Display 6). The multiple is still in the tenth decile historically, but the decline this year implies a more positive outlook for long-term returns. Moreover, we expect real interest rates to remain anchored below the historical average, which should support multiples.

Display 6: Equity Valuations Indicate Support for Long-Run Returns
US Shiller Cyclically Adjusted Price Earnings (CAPE) Multiple and 10-Year-Forward Returns
Display 6: Equity Valuations Indicate Support for Long-Run Returns

Historical analysis and current forecasts do not guarantee future results.
As of October 20, 2022
Source: Robert Shiller’s database, Thomson Reuters Datastream and AB 

Credit: Higher Yields Balanced with Caution on Slower Growth Impact  

Our recent conversations with clients about credit from a multi-asset context reveal divided views. On one hand, nominal yields for both investment-grade and high-yield bonds are near the top of their range from the past decade—undeniably attractive to investors starved of return sources for many years. From a cross-asset perspective, however, there are differing views on whether enough of a slowdown is priced in from a tactical perspective.

In Display 7, we show credit spreads during previous recessions, and in that context the yield surge seems to have more to do with the underlying risk-free rate increase than spreads per se. We acknowledge that corporate balance sheets are currently in better health than they usually are when entering a period of slower growth. Also, in the US at least, debt has been refinanced at longer terms. However, growth is slowing down. We’re not saying spreads need to reach previous recessionary highs, given the other factors noted, but there is potential scope for them to move wider.

Display 7: US Credit Spreads and Economic Recessions
Display 7: US Credit Spreads and Economic Recessions

Historical analysis and current forecasts do not guarantee future results.
As of November 2, 2022
Source: FRED, Thomson Reuters Datastream and AB

How can one approach credit positioning tactically? Based on the past decade, the spread of high-yield and investment-grade credit yields over US equity dividend yields implies, at face value, that credit could outperform, given the recent rise in spreads (Displays 8 and 9). However, extending the history back to include previous recessions implies that outperformance usually stems from a higher starting spread level.

So, we see a near-term case to own investment-grade credit but are more cautious on high yield. We would, however, want to add an overweight to high yield over longer horizons. This outlook mirrors our position in equities, emphasizing more defensive income/cash-rich companies in the near term and a more positive case for core value as an inflation hedge over the longer term.

Display 8: Investment-Grade Credit Yield and Credit/Equities Relative Return
Display 8: Investment-Grade Credit Yield and Credit/Equities Relative Return

Historical analysis and current forecasts do not guarantee future results.
IG: investment-grade
As of October 31, 2022
Source: FRED, Thomson Reuters Datastream and AB

Display 9: High-Yield Credit Yield and Credit/Equities Relative Return
Percent
Display 9: High-Yield Credit Yield and Credit/Equities Relative Return

Historical analysis and current forecasts do not guarantee future results.
As of October 31, 2022
Source: FRED, Thomson Reuters Datastream and AB

Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities (TIPS) vs. Nominal Bonds

The surge in yields prompts a question: Is it an attractive point to add government bonds? For investors targeting real return, there are two issues—whether the return is sufficient, even after expectations have been adjusted upward in coming months, and the role of duration if it’s less effective at diversifying equity beta. However, for investors with fixed nominal liabilities, 2022 could be a gamechanger that makes it easier to meet those liabilities.

For investors with real liabilities, we see the main role of high-grade fixed income as protecting against drawdowns. Admittedly, that didn’t work out well in 2022, but we do think this asset is important even if it’s less useful as a long-term diversifier of equity beta.3 In that drawdown mitigation role, we would favor short duration, given the flat-to-inverted yield curve.

Historically, US TIPS have tended to outperform nominal government bonds in periods of elevated inflation (Display 10), most notably in the early and late 1970s but also at certain points during the 1990s and—more recently—in 2021. 

Display 10: TIPS Have Tended to Outperform in Higher-Inflation Periods
US 10-Year TIPS Performance vs. US 10-Year Nominal Government Bonds (Percent)
Display 10: TIPS Have Tended to Outperform in Higher-Inflation Periods

Historical analysis and current forecasts do not guarantee future results.
TIPS: Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities
As of October 31, 2022
Source: Thomson Reuters Datastream and AB

The valuation of TIPS has rapidly become more attractive, too (Display 11), trading at 0.3 standard deviations above their historical average versus 0.7 for US 10-year government bonds. In fact, inflation-linked bonds have seen the biggest valuation shift across a broad range of return streams that could be used for inflation protection. The most expensive form of inflation protection a year ago, TIPS have seen their valuations compress by more than two standard deviations.

Display 11: TIPS Have Seen the Biggest Valuation Move of Inflation-Sensitive Assets
Display 11: TIPS Have Seen the Biggest Valuation Move of Inflation-Sensitive Assets

Historical analysis and current forecasts do not guarantee future results.
Data starts from January 1970 or earliest available date (indicated in Start Date column) and runs through September 2022. Equity index valuations are cyclically adjusted earnings yield (1/CAPE ratio). Bond valuation is based on yield. Relative valuation is measured as the relative 12-month forward earnings yield (1/price-to-earnings) relative to the broader US market. Z score of the 60/40 portfolio is calculated as 0.6*z score of US equities and 0.4* z score of US 10-year government bonds. Higher z score value indicates a higher premium to historic valuation.
As of September 30, 2022
Source: FRED, Global Financial Data, MSCI, Thomson Reuters Datastream and AB

While stagflation isn’t our base-case forecast, growth is slowing and inflation has been stickier than expected, increasing stagflation risks in recent months. As we showed in earlier research, TIPS have historically been one of the best-performing assets in periods of stagflation (Display 12). In the current environment, a TIPS allocation could also be viewed as an insurance policy against such an outcome.

Display 12: Return Sources That May Help in Stagflation Periods
Year-over-Year Returns
Display 12: Return Sources That May Help in Stagflation Periods

Historical analysis and current forecasts do not guarantee future results.
Scenario One: Historic inflationary shocks that coincided with a sharp slowdown in real economic growth, with date ranges including 1Q:1970–4Q:1970, 1Q:1974–3Q:1975, 4Q:1979–4Q:1980, 1Q:1982–4Q:1982, and 3Q:1990–3Q:1991
Scenario Two: A narrower definition of inflationary shocks and low growth looking only at periods where real GDP growth was less than 1% and inflation was more than 4%. Those include: 1Q:1970–4Q:1970, 1Q:1974–3Q:1975, 2Q:1980–4Q:1980, 1Q:1982–4Q:1982, and 4Q:1990–2Q:1991
Scenario Three: Based on the changes in growth and inflation, this scenario focuses on the scenario one episodes but extends the time horizon to earlier quarters, when higher growth was beginning to slow and inflation starting to rise. This scenario includes only quarters where declining real growth coincided with rising inflation, including 3Q:1973–4Q:1974, 1Q:1979–1Q:1980, and 2Q:1990–4Q:1990
Analysis covers the period from January 1, 1970, through September 30, 1991
Source: AQR Capital Management, Global Financial Data, Kenneth R. French Data Library, Robert Shiller’s database, Thomson Reuters Datastream and AB

Furthermore, we see constraints on how high real yields can climb. One needs to be humble in forecasting, given that the surge in real yields has taken many by surprise. However, we would argue that macro forces put downward pressure on real yields over a strategic horizon:

  • If real yields are an indicator of expected future growth, then deglobalization and demographic changes imply lower growth unless productivity increases significantly, which is very hard to forecast. 
  • We’ve argued that pension system health and policy are intimately linked, and a growing share of defined contribution assets would be hurt by a sizable increase in real yields. 
  • We think developed-market governments will be tempted to monetize their debt as a way to deal with high debt/gross-domestic-product ratios, implying lower interest rates per unit of inflation. 

Equity Factor Exposures

Within equities, our strategic and tactical views on factors echo our broader views on asset classes over these different time horizons. Strategically, over a 10-year-plus horizon, we want to be long deep, or cyclical, value. This positioning is consistent with our more constructive view on risk assets, including equities, in the long term.

Value is our key strategic factor position globally and can be expressed through both long/short and long-only exposure. The pro-value view is supported by the combination of attractive valuations (value stocks remain cheap versus their long-term history) and a favorable macro outlook—specifically our expectation that nominal yields will be higher over the strategic horizon, and that longer-term inflation expectations haven’t adjusted upward yet.  

Tactically, we would temper our exposure to deep value in favor of more defensive value measures, such as dividend yield. Again, this aligns with the greater tactical caution we discussed earlier: a tactically cautious view on equities and a preference for quality (investment-grade) within credit. We also see tactical exposures to low-volatility stocks and high-quality stocks as attractive. High-dividend, low-volatility and quality stocks are also attractively valued versus history and likely to outperform in the near term as the economy slows or enters recession.

These factor preferences are global; we’ll follow up with more granular analysis for regional factors. Unless otherwise stated, our views can be implemented using simple MSCI factor definitions and indices. These views are in many ways a natural extension of our broader views on asset allocation, but it may also be helpful to be explicit about how we think about factor positioning—we’ll do this in the rest of this section. 

Value: Strategic Overweight but Tactical Caution 

Our framework for forming factor views uses two key inputs: the macro environment and style valuations. The macro environment is the most important over a strategic horizon. Key variables include outlooks for the stage of the cycle, long and short rates, and inflation. Other macro and market variables matter over the long term, such as the changes in the yield curve, credit spreads, the equity risk premium, market volatility and policy uncertainty. We’ve studied these relationships empirically over long horizons and summarized them in Displays 13–15. We show more of these relationships in Displays 24–29 in the Appendix

Display 13: Global Economic Cycle
OECD Lead Indicator
Display 13: Global Economic Cycle

Note: table shows the annualized return for factor portfolios in different economic cycles from January 1990 to July 2018. Factor returns are defined as the long-short return of the top-bottom quintile from the 500 largest stocks in the MSCI World Index. Portfolios have been rebalanced quarterly and returns are on equal-weighted total return basis. Periods of the economic cycles are defined by the normalized seasonally adjusted composite leading indicator from the OECD. The universe of the indicator is based on the OECD + the six Major Non-member economies. We divide up the world into four phases, with an expensionary level (>100) and positive first differential of the leading indicator being classifed as an “expansion,” an expansionary level with negative first differential being a “slowdown,” a contraction level (<100) and positive first differential being classified as a “recovery,” and a contraction level with negative first differential being a “downturn.”
Note: t-stats are calculated using two samples t-test (Welch’s t-test) with unequal sample sizes and unequal variances
January 31, 1990, through July 31, 2018
Source: MSCI, OECD, Thomson Reuters Datastream and AB

Display 14: Global 10-Year Yield
Display 14: Global 10-Year Yield

Note: table shows the annualized return from factor portfolios in different rate environments from January 1990 to July 2018. Factor returns are defined as the long-short return of the top-bottom quintile from the 500 largest stocks in the MSCI World Index. Portfolios have been rebalanced quarterly and returns are on equal-weighted total return basis. The yield curve is calculated as the difference between 10-year and two-year rates. We take an equity market cap weighted average of national yields to form a global measure.
Note: t-stats are calculated using two samples t-test (Welch’s t-test) with unequal sample sizes and unequal variances
January 31, 1990, through July 31, 2018
Source: MSCI, Thomson Reuters Datastream and AB

Display 15: Global CPI
Display 15: Global CPI

Note: table shows the annualized return from factor portfolios in different inflation environments from January 1990 to July 2018. Factor returns are defined as the long-short return of the top-bottom quintile from the 500 largest stocks in the MSCI World Index. Portfolios have been rebalanced quarterly and returns are on equal-weighted total return basis. We take an equity market cap weighted average of core inflation yields to form a global measure.
Note: t-stats are calculated using two samples t-test (Welch’s t-test) with unequal sample sizes and unequal variances
January 31, 1990, through July 31, 2018
Source: MSCI, Thomson Reuters Datastream and AB

Looking beyond the near-term prospects of an economic downturn, where value tends to struggle, value performs particularly well in recoveries, which tend to be the best environment for these stocks. It also holds up well in later-stage expansions. Rising yields support value, which fits with our preference for short duration across asset classes. 

We’ve argued elsewhere that long-term inflation expectations may not yet have risen enough to reflect a strategically higher inflation level than what’s been normal over the past three decades. The current 10-year breakeven inflation rate is still below our 10-year inflation forecast of 3% (Display 16); as expectations adjust higher, this should also help value stocks (Displays 17 and 18)

Display 16: The 10-Year Breakeven Inflation Rate Has Risen
Display 16: The 10-Year Breakeven Inflation Rate Has Risen

Historical analysis and current forecasts do not guarantee future results.
As of October 11, 2022
Source: Bloomberg and AB

Display 17: Value Performance and US Inflation Expectations
Display 17: Value Performance and US Inflation Expectations

Historical analysis and current forecasts do not guarantee future results.
Charts show the daily performance of cheap price-to-book stocks relative to expensive price-to-book stocks vs. the regional 5y5y inflation swap.
Data from January 1, 2015, through October 7, 2022
Source: Bloomberg, MSCI and AB

Display 18: Value Performance and European Inflation Expectations
Display 18: Value Performance and European Inflation Expectations

Historical analysis and current forecasts do not guarantee future results.
Charts show the daily performance of cheap price-to-book stocks relative to expensive price-to-book stocks vs. the regional 5y5y inflation swap.
Data from January 1, 2015, through October 7, 2022
Source: Bloomberg, MSCI and AB

The second input in assessing style prospects is style valuations. Display 19 shows our valuation measures for key global factors, expressed as z scores versus the 30-year history (please see the display footnote for a more detailed definition). Deep value, as proxied by the simple price-to-book factor, remains cheap. On a long-only basis, it’s trading at 1.5 standard deviations below the long-term average. Display 20 shows that value’s valuations remain at historical lows, despite some recent periods of better performance.

Display 19: Valuations for Key Global Factors
12-Month Forward Price/Earnings Z Score
Display 19: Valuations for Key Global Factors

Historical analysis and current estimates do not guarantee future results.
Table shows the z scores vs. long-term average valuations for long-only factor baskets relative to global market. The universe is the largest 500 stocks in MSCI World Index, factors proxy MSCI definitions, and we take the median forward P/E multiple of each factor basket vs. the market as a valuation measure.
January 31, 1990, through October 31, 2022
Source: FactSet, MSCI and AB

Display 20: Global Value Factor Is Cheap
Long-Only Price-to-Book Factor Valuation
Display 20: Global Value Factor Is Cheap

Historical analysis and current forecasts do not guarantee future results.
Chart shows the median forward P/E of the stocks in the P/B factor basket vs. the market. The basket is rebalanced quarterly.
As of October 31, 2022
Source: FactSet, MSCI and AB

Of course, value faces tactical headwinds, given the potential for an economic downturn—as we’ve shown, cyclical value, such as the simple price-to-book factor, underperforms significantly in recessions. Valuations don’t offer much support over this shorter horizon, and other macro drivers—including the possibility of credit spreads widening further in the near term—will likely present challenges. So, our preference for deep value is very much a longer-term trade that we think is likely to work over a multiyear horizon. Over the next six to 12 months, we would want to dial that exposure down in favor of more defensive/income factors such as dividend yield, low volatility and quality. 

Tactical Tilt Toward Dividend Yield, Low Volatility and Quality 

All three of these “defensive” factors fare very well in downturns and recessions, as can be seen clearly in Display 13 earlier. There’s valuation support, too—dividend yield is extremely cheap versus history; relative to the market, it’s by far the cheapest of the key global factors, including all value factors. As can be seen in Display 19 earlier, it’s trading at an extreme 2.7 standard deviations below long-term history (we’ll return to this below). Quality and low volatility, while not as extreme, are also trading at multiples below long-term history. We also show this in Displays 21–23, where all three factors have de-rated considerably versus the market on a forward price-to-earnings basis over the past couple years.

Display 21: Global Dividend Yield Factor, 12-Month Forward P/E Ratio (Long Only)
Display 21: Global Dividend Yield Factor, 12-Month Forward P/E Ratio (Long Only)

Historical analysis and current forecasts do not guarantee future results.
Chart shows the median forward P/E of the stocks in the dividend yield factor basket vs. the market. The baskets are rebalanced quarterly.
As of October 31, 2022
Source: FactSet, MSCI and AB

Display 22: Global Low Volatility Factor, 12-Month Forward P/E Ratio (Long Only)
Display 22: Global Low Volatility Factor, 12-Month Forward P/E Ratio (Long Only)

Historical analysis and current forecasts do not guarantee future results.
Chart shows the median forward P/E of the stocks in the dividend yield factor basket vs. the market. The baskets are rebalanced quarterly.
As of October 31, 2022
Source: FactSet, MSCI and AB

Display 23: Global Quality Factor, 12-Month Forward P/E Ratio (Long Only)
Display 23: Global Quality Factor, 12-Month Forward P/E Ratio (Long Only)

Historical analysis and current forecasts do not guarantee future results.
Chart shows the median forward P/E of the stocks in the dividend yield factor basket vs. the market. The baskets are rebalanced quarterly.
As of October 31, 2022
Source: FactSet, MSCI and AB

APPENDIX

Display 24: Annualized Global Factor Returns Based on Two-Year Bond Yield
Display 24: Annualized Global Factor Returns Based on Two-Year Bond Yield

Note: table shows the annualized return from factor portfolios in different rate environments from January 1990 to July 2018. Factor returns are defined  as the long-short return of the top-bottom quintile from the 500 largest stocks in the MSCI World Index. Portfolios have been rebalanced quarterly and returns are on equal-weighted total return basis. Short rates are two-year sovereign yields. We take an equity market cap weighted average of national yields to form a global measure.
Note: t-stats are calculated using two samples t-test (Welch’s t-test) with unequal sample sizes and unequal variances
January 31, 1990, through July 31, 2018
Source: MSCI, Thomson Reuters Datastream and AB

Display 25: Annualized Global Factor Returns Based on Yield-Curve Shape (10-Year Minus Two-Year)
Display 25: Annualized Global Factor Returns Based on Yield-Curve Shape (10-Year Minus Two-Year)

Note: table shows the annualized return from factor portfolios in different rate environments from January1990 to July 2018. Factor returns are defined  as the long-short return of the top-bottom quintile from the 500 largest stocks in the MSCI World Index. Portfolios have been rebalanced quarterly and returns are on equal-weighted total return basis. The yield curve is calculated as the difference between 10-year and two-year rates. We take an equity market cap weighted average of national yields to form a global measure.
Note: t-stats are calculated using two samples t-test (Welch’s t-test) with unequal sample sizes and unequal variances
January 31, 1990, through July 31, 2018
Source: MSCI, Thomson Reuters Datastream and AB

Display 26: Annualized Global Factor Returns Based on Credit Spread
Display 26: Annualized Global Factor Returns Based on Credit Spread

Note: table shows the annualized return from factor portfolios in different credit cycle environments from January 1990 to July 2018. Factor returns are defined as the long-short return of the top-bottom quintile from the 500 largest stocks in the MSCI World Index. Portfolios have been rebalanced quarterly and returns are on equal-weighted total return basis. We use US BAA–AAA credit spread to define the credit cycle
Note: t-stats are calculated using two samples t-test (Welch’s t-test) with unequal sample sizes and unequal variances
January 31, 1990, through July 31, 2018
Source: MSCI, Thomson Reuters Datastream and AB

Display 27: Annualized Global Factor Returns Based on NBER Gross Domestic Product Cycles
Display 27: Annualized Global Factor Returns Based on NBER Gross Domestic Product Cycles

Note: table shows the annualized return from factor portfolios in different GDP cycles from January1990 to July 2018. Factor returns are defined  as the long-short return of the top-bottom quintile from the 500 largest stocks in the MSCI World Index. Portfolios have been rebalanced quarterly and returns are on equal-weighted total return basis. Periods of expansion and recession are defined by the NBER. The analysis has been run until May 2010 (early recovery)—one year after the end of the last recession in June 2009.
Note: t-stats are calculated using two samples t-test (Welch’s t-test) with unequal sample sizes and unequal variances
January 31, 1990, through July 31, 2018
Source: MSCI, Thomson Reuters Datastream and AB

Display 28: Annualized Global Factor Returns Based on Volatility (Three-Month VIX Moving Average)
Display 28: Annualized Global Factor Returns Based on Volatility (Three-Month VIX Moving Average)

Note: table shows the annualized return from factor portfolios in different VIX cycles from January 1990 to July 2018. Factor returns are defined  as the long-short return of the top-bottom quintile from the 500 largest stocks in the MSCI World Index. Portfolios have been rebalanced quarterly and returns are on equal-weighted total return basis. VIX cycles are defined using the three-month moving average of the index.
Note: t-stats are calculated using two samples t-test (Welch’s t-test) with unequal sample sizes and unequal variances
January 31, 1990, through July 31, 2018
Source: MSCI, Thomson Reuters Datastream and AB 

Display 29: Annualized Global Factor Returns Based on Policy Uncertainty (Three-Month Moving Average)
Display 29: Annualized Global Factor Returns Based on Policy Uncertainty (Three-Month Moving Average)

Note: table shows the annualized return from factor portfolios in different policy uncertainty cycles from January 1997 to July 2018. Factor returns are defined as the long-short return of the top-bottom quintile from the 500 largest stocks in the MSCI World Index. Portfolios have been rebalanced quarterly and returns are on equal-weighted total return basis. The cycles are defined using the  Global Economic Policy Uncertainty Index from www.policyucertainty.com, taking a three-month moving average.
Note: t-stats are calculated using two samples t-test (Welch’s t-test) with unequal sample sizes and unequal variances
January 31, 1990, through July 31, 2018
Source: MSCI; "Global Economic Policy Uncertainty Index," Economic Policy Uncertainty, http://www.policyuncertainty.com; Thomson Reuters Datastream and AB

1 A host of forces are at work here, such as the rise of exchange-traded funds pushing more trading to the close and the presence of high-frequency trades, which are usually providers of liquidity but can pull back when volume rises. See Inigo Fraser Jenkins and Alla Harmsworth, Private Assets and the Future of Asset Allocation, Institutional Solutions (AllianceBernstein, 2021).

2 For more details about this model please see Portfolio Strategy: Opportunities for Value and Growth managers in US equities, Bernstein Research, July 30, 2019.

3 For a longer discussion of this trade-off between drawdown mitigation and diversification versus income, please see Inigo Fraser Jenkins and Alla Harmsworth, What Happens When Diversification Disappears, AllianceBernstein, 2022.

For Investment Professional use only. Not for inspection by, distribution or quotation to, the general public.

The value of an investment can go down as well as up, and investors may not get back the full amount they invested. Capital is at risk. Past performance does not guarantee future results.

Important Information

The information contained herein reflects the views of AllianceBernstein L.P. or its affiliates and sources it believes are reliable as of the date of this publication. AllianceBernstein L.P. makes no representations or warranties concerning the accuracy of any data. There is no guarantee that any projection, forecast or opinion in this material will be realized.

The views expressed herein may change at any time after the date of this publication. AllianceBernstein L.P. does not provide tax, legal or accounting advice. It does not take an investor’s personal investment objectives or financial situation into account; investors should discuss their individual circumstances with appropriate professionals before making any decisions.

References to specific securities are provided solely in the context of the analysis presented and are not to be considered recommendations by AllianceBernstein. AllianceBernstein and its affiliates may have positions in, and may effect transactions in, the markets, industry sectors and companies described herein.

MSCI makes no express or implied warranties or representations and shall have no liability whatsoever with respect to any MSCI data contained herein. The MSCI data may not be further redistributed or used as a basis for other indices or any securities or financial products. This report is not approved, reviewed or produced by MSCI.

Note to All Readers: The information contained here reflects the views of AllianceBernstein L.P. or its affiliates and sources it believes are reliable as of the date of this publication. AllianceBernstein L.P. makes no representations or warranties concerning the accuracy of any data. There is no guarantee that any projection, forecast or opinion in this material will be realized.

Note to Readers in Canada: This publication has been provided by AllianceBernstein Canada, Inc. or Sanford C. Bernstein & Co., LLC and is for general information purposes only. It should not be construed as advice as to the investing in or the buying or selling of securities, or as an activity in furtherance of a trade in securities. Neither AllianceBernstein Institutional Investments nor AllianceBernstein L.P. provides investment advice or deals in securities in Canada. Note to Readers in the United Kingdom: Issued by AllianceBernstein Limited, 60 London Wall, London, EC2M 5SJ, registered in England, No 2551144. AllianceBernstein Limited is authorized and regulated in the UK by the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA). Note to Readers in Europe: This information is issued by AllianceBernstein (Luxembourg) S.a r.l. Societe a responsabilite limitee, R.C.S. Luxembourg B 34 305, 2-4, rue Eugene Ruppert, L-2453 Luxembourg. Authorised in Luxembourg and regulated by the Commission de Surveillance du Secteur Financier (CSSF). Note to Readers in Switzerland: This information is directed at Qualified Investors only. Issued by AllianceBernstein Schweiz AG, Zurich, a company registered in Switzerland under company number CHE-306 220 501. AllianceBernstein Schweiz AG is a financial service provider within the meaning of the Financial Services Act (FinSA) and is not subject to any prudential supervision in Switzerland, Further information on the company, its services and products, in accordance with Art 8 FinSA can be found on the Important Disclosures page at www.alliancebernstein.com. Note to Australian and New Zealand Readers: For Institutional Investor use only. Not for inspection by, distribution or quotation to, the general public. This document has been issued by AllianceBernstein Australia Limited (ABN 53 095 022 718 and AFSL 230698). Information in this document is intended only for persons who qualify as “wholesale clients,” as defined in the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth of Australia) or the Financial Advisers Act 2008 (New Zealand), and is general in nature and does not take into account any person’s objectives, financial situation or needs. Note to Readers in Hong Kong: For Institutional Investor use only. Not for inspection by, distribution or quotation to, the general public. This document is issued in Hong Kong by AllianceBernstein Hong Kong Limited (聯博香港有限公司). This document has not been reviewed by the Hong Kong Securities and Futures Commission. Note to Readers in Japan: For Institutional Investor use only. Not for inspection by, distribution or quotation to, the general public. This document has been provided by AllianceBernstein Japan Ltd. AllianceBernstein Japan Ltd. Is a registered investment-management company (registration number: Kanto Local Financial Bureau no. 303). It is also a member of the Japan Investment Advisers Association; the Investment Trusts Association, Japan; the Japan Securities Dealers Association; and the Type II Financial Instruments Firms Association. The product/service may not be offered or sold in Japan; this document is not made to solicit investment. Note to Readers in Singapore: For Institutional Investor use only. Not for inspection by, distribution or quotation to, the general public. This document has been issued by AllianceBernstein (Singapore) Ltd. (“ABSL”, Company Registration No. 199703364C). AllianceBernstein (Luxembourg) S.a r.l. is the management company of the Portfolio and has appointed ABSL as its agent for service of process and as its Singapore representative. AllianceBernstein (Singapore) Ltd. is regulated by the Monetary Authority of Singapore. This advertisement has not been reviewed by the Monetary Authority of Singapore. Note to Readers in Taiwan: For Institutional Investor use only. Not for inspection by, distribution or quotation to, the general public. This document is provided solely for informational purposes and is not investment advice, nor is it intended to be an offer or solicitation, and does not pertain to the specific investment objectives, financial situation or particular needs of any person to whom it is sent. This document is not an advertisement. AllianceBernstein L.P. is not licensed to, and does not purport to, conduct any business or offer any services in Taiwan. Note to Readers in China: For Institutional Investor use only. Not for inspection by, distribution or quotation to, the general public. This document is provided by AllianceBernstein (“AB”). This document has been provided to you for sole use in a private and confidential meeting. This document is not an advertisement and is not intended for public use or distribution to any third party beyond our private meeting. This document or any information contained or incorporated by reference herein does not constitute an offer to sell or the solicitation of an offer to purchase any financial instrument, product or service sponsored by AB or its affiliates within the People’s Republic of China (“PRC,” for such purposes, excluding Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan). AB does not provide tax, legal or accounting advice. In considering this material, you should discuss your individual circumstances with professionals in those areas before making any decisions. Note to Readers in Vietnam, the Philippines, Brunei, Thailand, Indonesia and India: For Institutional Investor use only. Not for inspection by, distribution or quotation to, the general public. This document is provided solely for informational purposes and is not investment advice, nor is it intended to be an offer or solicitation, and does not pertain to the specific investment objectives, financial situation or particular needs of any person to whom it is sent. This document is not an advertisement. AB is not licensed to, and does not purport to, conduct any business or offer any services in any of the above countries.

The [A/B] logo is a registered service mark of AllianceBernstein and AllianceBernstein® is a registered service mark used by permission of the owner, AllianceBernstein L.P.

© 2022 AllianceBernstein L.P., 501 Commerce St., Nashville, TN 37203


About the Authors